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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
probable theory as to the cause of death before the pre-
sumption is rebutted.-3
No less authority than the Supreme Court of the United
States, by implication in one case 14 and by adopting the
contra view in at least one other,'15 has shown opposition to
North Dakota's approach to this presumption.
Self-destruction is not uncommon. 16 It is submitted that,
by holding insurance companies to a standard of proof high-
er than other litigants, the courts are working a hardship
on the insurer. Iowa's change of attitude seems desirable.
North Dakota should follow the example.
LARRY KRAFT
STAR DECISIS-SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-PROSPECTIVE OVER-
RULING-The plaintiff brought an action against the de-
fendant school district, its principal, and a teacher for in-
juries sustained through the alleged negligence of the defend-
ants. The action against the school district was dismissed
by the District Court on the basis of sovereign immunity.
The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the District Court but
prospectively ruled that after the adjournment of the 1963
Minnesota Legislature the doctrine of sovereign tort immunity
would not be available to school districts, municipal corpora-
tions or other government subdivisions which had previously
been granted immunity by the court. Recognizing that the
prospective ruling was dictum the court said that equity
required that those who had depended on the prior law be
given time to protect themselves. Spanel v. Mound View
School Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962).
Sovereign immunity from tort liability has been a well
established principle of law.' This doctrine has been criticized
13. Svihovec v. Woodmen Ace. Co., 69 N.D. 259, 285 N.W. 447 (1939):
see Clemens v. Royal Neighbors, 14 N.D. 116, 103 N.W. 402 (1905).
14. See Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959) (dictum).
15. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Garner, 303 U.S. 161 (1938).
16. In 1961 there were 19,170 suicides reported in the United States
which is more than half as many deaths as were caused by motor vehicle
accidents. WORLD ALMANAC 304 (Hansen ed. 1963).
1. Mower v. The Inhabitants of Lecester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812); Rogers
v. Holmes,. 214 Ore. 687, 332 P.2d 608, 611 (1958) "That a sovereign state
cannot be sued without its consent is a cardinal principle of law so well
established as to require no citation."
[VOL. 39
RECENT CASES
by the courts2 and legal scholars 3 and held inapplicable
in the proprietary functions of government.4  Recently sev-
eral jurisdictions have judicially abolished the doctrine as to
school districts and other governmental functions.6  It is
apparent from the instant case that the Minnesota Supreme
Court intends to do the same unless restrained by the leg-
islature.
The judicial abolishment of a well established rule of
law appears to be in conflict with stare decisis.7 Succinctly,
the doctrine of stare decisis requires precedent to be followed
so that rights are protected and the law is given stability.,
Courts closely following statre decisis have refused to re-
examine rules of law on the ground that they have become
too well established for the courts to change.9 These hold-
ings recognize that stare decisis cannot be used to perpetuate
error, but they state that judicial change in the law should
be gradual, leaving abrubt change to the legislature. 10 They
also contend that the change of well established law is a policy
decision for the legislature to make."
Courts extinguishing sovereign tort immunity contend that
the doctrine is unjust and that stare decisis does not require
the perpetuation of error. 2  They also state that the courts
closed the door and thus they can open it. 3  Textwriters
argue that only social need for certainty and not satre decisis
should be considered by the courts. 4  They contend that
legislative inertia is eliminated by an abrupt judicial change
2. Colo. Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 205, 316 P.2d
582 (1957); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
3. Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1 (1924): Green.
Municipal Liability for Torts, 38 Ill. L. Rev. 355 (1944).
4. Bank of the U.S. v. Planters' Bank of Ga., 9 Wheat. 904 (1824):
Sargent Co. v. State, 47 N.D. 561, 182 N.W. 270 (1921).
5. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Dist. No. 302. 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d
89 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
6. Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961); Har-
grove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Williams v. City
of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1'961).
7. See, e.g., Prall v. Burckhartt, 299 I11. 19, 132 N.E. 280 (1921).
8. White v. Bateman, 89 Ariz. 110, 358 P.2d 712 (1961); State v. Cox.
43 Ariz. 174, 30 P.2d 825 (1934).
9. Rockafellor v. Gray, 194 Iowa 1280, 191 N.W. 107 (1922).
10. Layne v. Tribune Co., 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234 (1933).
11. Buck v. McLean, 115 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1959); Nelson v. Maine Turn-
pike Authority, 170 A.2d 687 (Me. 1961).
12. Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach. 96 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1957): Molitor
v. Kaneland Community Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1960); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231.
111 N.W.2d 1, 17 (1961).
13. Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961).
14. Kocourek, Retrospective Decisions and Stare Decisls and a Proposal,
17 A.B.A.J. 180, 182 (1931).
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of the law.1 5  This contention has merit. In Illinois, where
sovereign immunity was judicially abolished, 6 the legis-
lature promptly modified the decision by statute.",
Prospective overruling of well established law is not with-
out precedent,S and it has been approved by legal writers.19
The United States Supreme Court has held that prospective
ruling to be within the province of the courts.20 Michigan
has used the prospective opinion to remove tort immunity
from municipalities. 21 Such decisions follow stare decisis to
the extent that the law remains the same.22  At the same
time, future intentions are stated and affected parties may
protect themselves. Furthermore, legislative interest may be
attracted.2 3
It is submitted that by employing a prospective opinion
the Minnesota Supreme Court has substantially followed the
doctrine of stare decisis while attracting the attention of the
Minnesota Legislature to the court's opinion of sovereign tort
immunity.
R. LEE HAMILTON
15. Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
463, 475 (1962).
16. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11. 163
N.E.2d 89 (1959), cert. dlenied. 362 U.S. 968 (1960).
17. 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 122, § 825 (1959).
18. Jones v. Woodstock Iron Co., 95 Ala. 551, 10 So. 635 (1892); State
v. Bell, 136 N.C. 674, 49 S.E. 163 (1904); see Levy, Realist Jurisprudence
and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1960).
19. Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against Retroactive Operation of
an Overruling Decision, 18 Colum. L. Rev. 230, 251 (1918); Kocourek, Retro-
sepeetive Decisions and Stare Decisis 'and a Proposal, 17 A.B.A.J. 180. 192(1931); Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1960).
20: G.N.R.R. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
21. Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961).
22. ]bid .
23. Such is the case in Minnesota where since the decision several bills
have been introduced in the legislature which either reverse or modify
the instant case.
